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OUT OF CONTROL? THE USES AND ABUSES
OF PARENTAL LIABILITY LAWS TO CONTROL




How do we as a society control the antisocial and crimi-
nal acts of children? Particularly, how do we perceive the role
of the parent in this effort? The primary right of the parent to
the custody and control of his or her child, and the attendant
responsibility of the parent for his or her child, is a well-ac-
cepted principle of U.S. law.1 However, when a child commits
acts of juvenile delinquency,2 the point at which the larger
society should intervene in the parent-child relationship, and
the nature of the intervention, is not clear.
At different times in the recent history of the United
States, different approaches to the problem of juvenile delin-
quency, and different attitudes about the role of the parent in
the child's delinquency, have been popular.
At the turn of the 20th century, the reform movement
advocated removing children from their parents' custody and
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1. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
2. For the purposes of this article, the term "juvenile delinquency" is given
its broader definition to include not only acts committed which would have been
punishable as crimes if committed by an adult, but also to include acts which
would not have been punishable if committed by an adult, such as truancy and
curfew violations.
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substituting the juvenile court as parens patriae.3 By the
middle of the 20th century, came the recognition that the ju-
venile court was primarily punishing children, not reforming
them.4 Also at that time, parental liability laws began to be
adopted in many states, which greatly expanded the common
law tort and criminal liability of parents for the juvenile de-
linquent acts of their children. 5
These laws, it is argued, were adopted to control juvenile
delinquency by making parents responsible for their chil-
dren's actions. A review of the cases, both tort and criminal,
reveals an explicit or implicit rationale for these parental lia-
bility laws: punish or threaten to punish the parent for the
acts of his or her child, and that parent will exercise better
control over the child, reducing or eliminating acts of juvenile
delinquency by that child.6
Parental responsibility for juvenile delinquency was be-
ing emphasized by the enactment of parental liability laws by
many states in the 1950's and 1960's.7 By the late 1960's,
during the "war on poverty" initiated by President Johnson's
administration,' there was also a focus on the social causes of
delinquency. Although the importance of the family environ-
ment and the role of the parent in raising the child was ac-
knowledged, the role of social factors, such as poverty, urban
slums, and lack of access to resources such as playgrounds,
education and employment opportunities, were emphasized.9
Defining the problem of juvenile delinquency in terms of so-
cial factors suggested solutions requiring sweeping social re-
form through government intervention and resources. 10
3. See discussion infra Part II. "Parens patriae,' literally 'parent of the
country,' refers traditionally to role of state as sovereign and guardian of per-
sons under legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane .... It is the princi-
ple that the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such
as minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents." BLAci's LAw
DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
4. See discussion infra Part II.
5. See discussion infra Part III.
6. See discussion infra Part III.
7. See discussion infra Part III.
8. See generally DAVID ZAREFSKY, PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S WAR ON POVERTY:
RHETORIC AND HISTORY (1986).
9. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 55-89 (1967) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT].
10. See id. at 66-77, 293-94.
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If juvenile delinquency deeply disturbed us as a society
in the 1960's, it horrifies us in the 1990's, with evidence that
in the last ten years juvenile crime has not only increased,
but become more violent.11 Thus, at the threshold of the 21st
century, the causes of juvenile delinquency and the role of the
parent are again being scrutinized. Now, big government is
out, downsizing is in, and a Democratic president, as well as
a Republican-controlled Congress, has supported substantial
reductions in the federal welfare system, which provides ben-
efits to poor parents and their children. 1 2 The leaders of both
parties have emphasized "family values" and the importance
of parents in the prevention of juvenile antisocial behavior
and criminal acts. 3
The most effective way to prevent crime is to assure all citizens full
opportunity to participate in the benefits and responsibilities of soci-
ety. Especially in inner cities, achievement of this goal will require
extensive overhauling and strengthening of the social institutions in-
fluential in making young people strong members of the community-
schools, employment, the family, religious institutions, housing, wel-
fare, and others. Careful planning and evaluation and enormous in-
creases in money and personnel are needed to expand existing pro-
grams of promise and to develop additional approaches.
Id. at 293.
The President's Commission Report, written at approximately the time of
the Supreme Court's decision in In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), also criticized
the lack of procedural due process in the juvenile justice system, and recom-
mended procedural safeguards for juveniles such as restricted prehearing de-
tentions, notice, and representation by counsel. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N RE-
PORT, supra note 9, at 85-87, 294.
11. See Dan Coats, Coats Says Federal Government Incomplete on Juvenile
Crime, Congressional Press Releases, FED. DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE, July
15, 1996; Neal R. Peirce, Juvenile Crime Dip: Can We Build on It?, NATION'S
CITIES WKLY., Sept. 16, 1996, at 4.
12. See Gene Gibbons, Clinton Highlights Welfare Reform as Campaign
Trip Starts, REUTERS NORTH AMERICAN WIRE, Sept. 10, 1996; Virginia Ellis,
Faye Fiore & Mark Gladstone, Reforms to Allow State to Make Cuts; Impact:
Welfare Benefits Would Be Reduced for Poor Parents and Children, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 1996, at Al (Home Edition).
13. See, supra note 12; Remarks Via Satellite by the Presumptive Republi-
can Nominee for President Robert J. Dole, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, July 16,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew file. In his remarks to the
National Governor's Association at their national conference, former senator
Dole stated: "And we know where the explanation [for violent teenage crime]
starts: The failures of families have left a moral and spiritual vacuum at the
core of children's lives. A moral compass is always a gift of a caring adult, and
families transmit values that can defeat violence. In the long run, the best anti-
crime program is the renewal of family life in America." Id. See generally
Michael Barone, The Year of the Great Parental Pitch, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REP., Sept. 9, 1996, at 7.
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Should we as a society realistically depend primarily
upon parents to stem the rising tide of juvenile delinquency
in the United States? The rationale behind the parental lia-
bility laws-punishing the parents to reduce acts of juvenile
delinquency by their children-must be based upon a series
of interconnected assumptions. First, that a child's behavior
is primarily due to the parents' actions or inactions and not to
other factors; adequate parenting results in a well-behaved
and law-abiding child, while poor parenting results in a juve-
nile delinquent. Thus, parental action or inaction is per-
ceived as a primary cause, if not the cause, of juvenile
delinquency.
Second, there is presumed to be a universal model of ade-
quate parenting which is generally applicable, regardless of
other factors, such as race, ethnicity, culture, social class, eco-
nomic status, or other personal or socio-economic factors.
Thus, all parents are presumed to know what adequate
parenting is, and to have both the ability and the resources to
adequately parent; if they are not, then it follows that they
must be intentionally or negligently avoiding doing what they
know they should do, and can do. Either civil or criminal
"punishment" is therefore justified as a means of reforming
the parent, to reform the child. The punishment, or threat of
punishment, is assumed to cause the parent to adopt the
"good" parenting practices which will then result in a reduc-
tion or elimination of juvenile delinquency in the child.
Have these assumptions been borne out in the uses of pa-
rental liability legislation in the last thirty or forty years in
the United States, since these laws were widely adopted in
most states? There is almost no information on whether pa-
rental liability laws have actually resulted in a reduction in
juvenile delinquency; the little (and mainly anecdotal) infor-
mation available suggests that they have not. 14
Although the enactment of the parental liability laws
shows a willingness by society to blame parents for juvenile
delinquency, there appears to be, at the same time, a reluc-
tance to actually punish parents for their parenting, unless
the parent has actively encouraged or solicited the child's de-
linquent act. A discussion of the uses of one criminal paren-
tal liability law in Los Angeles, California, is offered as an
14. See discussion infra Part III.
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example of the tension between society's desire to blame par-
ents for the juvenile delinquency of their children, and soci-
ety's reluctance to actually punish them. 5 Tacitly acknowl-
edging the difficulty of convicting parents for a failure to
adequately supervise and control children involved in juve-
nile gang activity, the city attorney's office has instead pur-
sued a policy of referring parents to parenting classes
through a statutorily approved diversion program, with the
threat of criminal prosecution if they do not attend.' 6 Under
the City of Los Angeles approach, rather than being per-
ceived as malicious or lazy, parents are perceived as merely
untrained. Less punitive than fines or incarceration,
mandatory parenting classes are a means of holding parents
accountable for their children's acts, while conceding that
their failure in parenting may not be intentional, or even neg-
ligent. Unfortunately, the Los Angeles City Attorney's office
has apparently not attempted any assessment of the effec-
tiveness of the parenting classes it is so assiduously
promoting. 17
Turning to the theories and research on the causes of ju-
venile delinquency, this article argues that a primary focus
on parental responsibility for juvenile delinquency is ill ad-
vised; neither theoretical models nor available empirical re-
search suggest that parental action or inaction is the primary
cause ofjuvenile delinquency.' 8 In certain situations, such as
juvenile gang involvement by a child, parental action or inac-
tion appears to be eclipsed by other factors as the primary
cause of the child's delinquent acts.' 9 Although there is some
evidence that parenting skills can be improved by parenting
classes, 20 and that the delinquent acts of children whose par-
ents have taken parenting classes may decrease in some in-
stances, 2' this article concludes that more empirical testing
of the uses of parenting classes should be conducted before
parenting classes are widely adopted as a potential means of
reducing juvenile delinquency.
15. See discussion infra Part IV.
16. See discussion infra Part IV.
17. See discussion infra Part IV.
18. See discussion infra Part V.
19. See discussion infra Part V.
20. See discussion infra Part V.
21. See discussion infra Part V.
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Although discouraged by the failure of the juvenile jus-
tice system established by the early 20th century reform
movement and disillusioned about the possibility of govern-
ment structured social change as envisioned in the 1960's, in
the 1990's we should not ignore the multiplicity of factors
which may contribute to juvenile delinquency and focus myo-
pically on parental responsibility. Offering a tempting target,
parents are not the "problem" and neither parental punish-
ment nor parental training through parenting classes is "the
solution" to the juvenile delinquency conundrum in the
United States. Instead, we must continue to pursue a multi-
plicity of solutions to this complex social problem; parental
liability laws should be acknowledged as only a partial solu-
tion, not effective when children, for a variety of reasons, may
be beyond their parents' control.
Part II of this article briefly discusses the failure of the
reformer's vision of the juvenile court system as a substitute
"good" parent for delinquent children. Part III, explores the
statutory expansion of both tort and criminal parental liabil-
ity laws, and concludes that the rationale behind the mid-
20th century increase in the adoption of these laws has been
the goal of controlling juvenile delinquency by punishing the
parent, either with civil damages or criminal penalties. Fur-
ther, the lack of any reliable information showing that these
laws have in fact resulted in a reduction in juvenile delin-
quency is emphasized. Part IV examines the Los Angeles,
California practice of referring parents to parenting classes
as an alternative to criminal prosecution to explore whether
parenting classes can be an effective means of controlling ju-
venile delinquency, even when children are involved in juve-
nile gang activity and appear to be beyond their parents' con-
trol. Finally, Part V reviews the theories and research on the
causes of juvenile delinquency. Specifically, the role of par-
ents in causing juvenile delinquency is reviewed and the con-
clusion is reached that there is no consensus among the ex-
perts on the causes of delinquency or the role that parents
play in it.
Although some evidence exists that parenting classes
may be useful in some cases to reduce juvenile delinquency,
parent training is not an all purpose tool for its control. Juve-
nile delinquency is a complex problem for which there are no
easy solutions: Punishing or training parents is not an effec-
[Vol. 37
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tive solution when bad parenting is not a significant cause of
the child's delinquency.
II. THE FAILURE OF THE JUVENILE COURT AS
"PARENS PATRIAE"
The very concept of "juvenile delinquency" was unknown
at common law. Children under seven were presumed inca-
pable of forming criminal intent and those over seven were, if
convicted of a crime, punished as adults.22
The first "juvenile court" was established in Illinois in
1899.23 It was established based on the premise that, where
the parents had failed in their duty to supervise and train
their child, the state should assume that role as parens pa-
triae.24 The vision was that the judge, as a substitute wise
and caring parent, could provide the guidance the child had
lacked because of inadequate parenting.25
Rather than punishment (for either the parent or the
child), the goal of the juvenile court system was reform.26
The child was perceived as essentially good, and in need of
proper care and guidance. With such care and guidance, the
child would be reformed and the antisocial or criminal behav-
ior would cease.27 Since the child was no longer being pun-
ished for committing a crime, he or she was no longer to be
stigmatized by the label "criminal". Acts which would have
been crimes if the perpetrator had been convicted as an adult
became acts of "juvenile delinquency".28 The child was not
prosecuted for commission of a crime, so the safeguards of
procedural due process were deemed unnecessary. 29 The ju-
venile court proceedings determined whether the child was
22. See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967); M.A. BORTNER, DELINQUENCY
AND JUSTICE: AN AGE OF CRISIS, ch. 3 (1988). At common law, children could be
liable for civil tort damages, but often had no property from which such dam-
ages could be paid if awarded. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 123, at 913 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER ON
TORTS (5th ed.)].
23. See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14.
24. See id. at 16.
25. See id. at 26.
26. See M.A. BORTNER, supra note 22, at 47.
27. See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15; Gilbert Geis & Arnold Binder, Sins of
Their Children: Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Delinquency, 5 NOTR
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'y 303 n.2 (1991).
28. See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. at 22-24.
29. See id. at 17; M.A. BORTNER, supra note 22, at 44.
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placed on probation while remaining in the custody of his
parents (but under the supervision of a court probation of-
ficer), or removed from the parents' care and placed in a more
"wholesome" environment.3 0 Action by the court was theoret-
ically designed to reform, not punish.3 1
Thus, at the inception of the juvenile court system in the
United States, the structure of that system was based upon a
belief that parenting affects a child's behavior, and that bet-
ter parenting will reduce or eliminate juvenile delinquency.
However, the system focused on substituting the state's
agents (as parens patriae) for the child's parents, not on
changing the behavior of the child's own parents as a means
of eliminating juvenile delinquency in the child.
By the early 1960's all states had adopted a juvenile
court system based on the Illinois model.32 At that time,
sixty years after the juvenile court movement began, it was
clear that the early reformers' primary goal of rehabilitating
delinquent children was not being achieved. Instead,
although children were no longer being incarcerated with
adults in adult prison facilities, their detention in "reform
schools" and other facilities was conceded to be punitive, not
rehabilitative, in effect. 3
3
However, long before the recognition by the Supreme
Court in In Re Gault that the juvenile court system through-
out the United States was woefully failing in its goal of reha-
bilitation,34 statutes in various states had begun to focus di-
rectly on the "parent factor" in juvenile delinquency,
extending the limited common law parental liability for crim-
inal law and tortious acts by children.3 5 Thus, although the
juvenile court system was focusing on the delinquent child,
parental responsibility for juvenile delinquency was a grow-
ing concern of the U.S. legal system.
30. M.A. BORTNER, supra note 22, at 43-50.
31. See id.
32. See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14 & n.14.
33. See id. at 27.
34. See id. at 22.
35. See discussion infra Part III.
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III. PARENTAL LIABILITY LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: DOES PUNISHING PARENTS REDUCE
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY?
Parental liability for the acts of minor children has taken
two forms under state legislation: vicarious tort liability and
criminal liability.36 A review of the history of both tort and
criminal parental liability in the United States suggests that
as the disenchantment with the juvenile court system and its
apparent inability to reduce juvenile delinquency grew in the
1950's and 1960's, states in increasing numbers began enact-
ing parental liability legislation.3" Although other rationales
could be offered for both tort and criminal parental liability
legislation, a review of selected cases supports the conclusion
that these laws were enacted as a means of reducing antiso-
cial and criminal behavior by juveniles.38 However, as dis-
cussed below, there is little evidence that these laws are hav-
ing the desired effect. 39
A. Parental Liability for Tortious Acts of Minor Children:
An Effort to Reduce Juvenile Delinquency by the
Threat of Civil Damages
1. Common Law Limitations on Parental
Tort Liability
At common law, a parent generally could not be held lia-
ble for civil damages for the tortious acts of his or her minor
child.4 0 Exceptions allowed liability, but usually only upon a
showing of the parent's act or omission in certain circum-
stances, not merely because of the parent/child relation-
ship.4 For example, under general tort principles, a parent
could be held liable if she or he directed, encouraged or rati-
fied the child's conduct.42 Further, a parent could be held vi-
cariously liable43 if the child acted as his or her "agent" or
36. See discussion infra Parts III.A and III.B.
37. See discussion infra Parts III.A.2 and III.B.2.
38. See discussion infra Part III.A.3 and B.3.
39. See discussion infra Part III.B.4 and B.6.
40. See PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 22 § 123, at 913.
41. See id. at 913-14.
42. See id. at 914.
43. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1566 (6th Ed. 1990): "Vicarious liability.
The imposition of liability on one person for the actionable conduct of another,
based solely on a relationship between the two persons. Indirect or imputed
62919971
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"employee", and within the scope of such agency or
employment.4 4
Liability could be based on the negligence of the parent
her/himself. For example, the parent could be liable "like
anyone else" if the parent negligently entrusted a dangerous
instrumentality to a child,45 or entrusted a thing to a child
which was dangerous because of the particular "handicaps"
or "propensity" of that specific child.46
In addition, the parent had a special duty because of the
parent/child relationship in respect to the tortious acts of his
or her own child.47 The parent had a duty at common law to
reasonably control the conduct of his or her child for the pro-
tection of others. 48 However, the cases appear to limit liabil-
ity to situations where the parent not only had notice of a
particular "dangerous tendency or proclivity" on the part of
his or her child, which in fact caused the injury, but also the
opportunity to prevent the injury by exercising reasonable
control over the child.49
Thus, where there was no foreseeability of the specific
tortious conduct which occurred because the parent had no
knowledge that the child had previously shown "tendencies"
toward such conduct, or where the parent had notice of such
"tendencies" but the injury occurred despite his or her exer-
cise of reasonable control over the child, then the parent was
not liable at common law.50
The common law stopped short of holding a parent vicari-
ously liable, in general, for the acts of his or her child, merely
because of the parent/child relationship. As the court stated
legal responsibility for acts of another, for example, the liability of an employer
for the acts of an employee, or, a principle for torts and contracts of an agent."
44. See PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 22 § 123, at 914.
45. Id.
46. Id. For example, a gun is a "dangerous instrumentality". See id.
Matches or an automobile are given as examples of things which are not inher-
ently dangerous, but which can be in the hands of a child. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 914-15.
49. See id. See, e.g., Emogene C. Wilhelm, Comment, Vicarious Parental
Liability in Connecticut: Is It Effective?, 7 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 99, 106-07 (1986)
and cases cited therein. If, for example, the parent, knowing of the child's
propensities for certain tortious conduct, did in fact make reasonable, good
faith efforts to control the child, he or she would not be liable for the child's
tortious act. See Wilhelm, supra at 107 n.47, citing Linder v. Bidner, 270
N.Y.S.2d 427 (1966).
50. PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 22 § 123, at 915.
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in Linder v. Bidner, "there is no general responsibility for the
rearing of incorrigible children."5
1
2. Statutory Extension of Parental Vicarious Tort
Liability for the Acts of Minor Children
However, the limited common law liability of parents for
their children's tortious acts has been extended by statute in
almost all states.52 The first U.S. jurisdictions to adopt some
form of tort parental liability were states (Hawaii and Louisi-
ana) with statutory systems based on civil law, not common
law.53 Unlike common law, civil law has traditionally al-
lowed parental vicarious liability for the tortious acts of
minors.54
Other jurisdictions did not quickly follow suit. It was not
until 1951 that another state, Nebraska, enacted a parental
tort liability statute.5 5 From 1951 through the 1960's, the
number of states which enacted parental tort liability stat-
utes increased dramatically. 56 At least one author has sug-
gested that these statutes were enacted as a direct result of
the increase in juvenile delinquency throughout the United
States during this period, in an effort to curb it. 57 By the late
1980's, all states but New Hampshire had enacted some form
of parental tort liability statute.5"
51. Linder, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 430. In the Linder case, the court found that
the complaint stated a cause of action against the parents where it alleged they
were aware of their son's habit of "mauling, pummeling, assaulting and mis-
treating smaller children," and further alleged that the parents did not exercise
reasonable control over their son to prevent such conduct, where they had the
opportunity to exercise such control. Id.
52. PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 22 § 123, at 913 (footnote omit-
ted); L. Wayne Scott, Liability of Parents for Conduct of Their Child under Sec-
tion 33.01 of the Texas Family Code: Defining the Requisite Standards of "Cul-
pability", 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 69 at app. (1988).
53. Geis & Binder, supra note 27, at 307 nn.20-22, citing HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 577-3 (1988) and L.A. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (West 1979, Supp. 1990).
54. See PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 22 § 123, at 913.
55. Geis & Binder, supra note 27, at 310 & n.39.
56. See Scott, supra note 52, at app. According to the appendix in Scott's
article, 33 states enacted parental tort liability statutes from 1951-1969. See
id.
57. See Richard G. Kent, Parental Liability for the Torts of Children, 50
CONN. B.J. 452, 465 (1976), cited in Wilhelm, supra note 49, at 109.
58. See Scott, supra note 52, at app. (noting that 49 states had parental tort
liability statutes as of 1987). The tort liability of parents for the tortious acts of
their children has generally survived constitutional attack where it has been
challenged. See PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 22 § 123, at 913. In
Corley v. Lewless, 182 S.E.2d 766 (Ga. 1971), the court held that Georgia's vica-
1997] 631
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Almost all of the statutory parental tort liability laws re-
quire more than mere negligence on the part of the child for
the parent to be held liable.59 Words such as "willful", "mali-
cious", "delinquent", "intentional" and "reckless" have been
used to describe the child's necessary state of mind.6 °
But in contrast to the common law approach, parental
liability under these acts is almost always vicarious liability
based solely on the parent/child relationship.6 ' No inten-
tional or negligent act or omission by the parent must be
proven to establish liability.6 2
Although some of the earlier statutes placed no monetary
limits on recovery,63 according to surveys done in the late
1980's, all jurisdictions with statutory parental tort liability
laws now place significant restrictions on the amount of re-
covery allowed.64 As of 1988, according to one commentator,
statutory limits ranged from $15,000 (Texas) to $250 (Ver-
mont), with an average of $2,500.65
3. The Rationale Behind Vicarious Parental Tort
Liability Statutes: Reduction of Juvenile
Delinquency
The limits on recovery suggest that the legislative intent
in enacting these parental liability statutes allowing tort re-
covery is not primarily to compensate the victims; if it were,
there would be no reason to statutorily restrict the recovery
rious parental tort liability statute was unconstitutional where parental liabil-
ity for damages was unlimited in terms of the amount of recovery allowed. The
legislature later amended the statute, providing for limited recovery (as most
state statutes do). See Hayward v. Ramick, 285 S.E.2d 697, 698 (Ga. 1982).
59. See Scott, supra note 52, at app.
60. See PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 22 § 123, at 913; see also
Scott, supra note 52, at app. Scott argues that in the Texas statute the words
'willful" and "malicious" should be interpreted as meaning "grossly negligent",
not "intentional". See id. at 78.
61. See discussion infra at Part III.A.1. At common law, a parent could be
held vicariously liable in tort for the acts of his or her child, but the basis for
vicarious liability was an employer/employee or principle/agent relationship,
not the parent/child relationship.
62. PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 22 § 123, at 913.
63. See Geis & Binder, supra note 27, at 311 & n.46.
64. See Geis & Binder, supra note 27, at 311 n.47, citing Scott, supra note
52, at app. (analyzing the information in Scott's appendix). More than half of
the statutes allow recovery for both personal injury and property damage, while
the rest allow recovery for property damage only. See Wilhelm, supra note 49,
at 121-24, cited in Geis & Binder, supra note 27, at 310 n.41.
65. See Scott, supra note 52, at app.
632 [Vol. 37
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which the common law has historically allowed victims of tor-
tious acts.66
Although almost every jurisdiction has adopted parental
tort liability statutes, there have not been many reported
cases. A review of the rationale for the legislation, as dis-
cussed by the court in some of these cases, confirms that com-
pensation of the victim is not the only, or even the primary,
motivation behind the adoption of these statutes.6 Instead,
the rationale which is given in the cases for the enactment of
these statutes is primarily the reduction of juvenile delin-
quency; it is presumed that the threat of civil damages will
encourage parents to better supervise their children, and that
better supervision of children will reduce juvenile tortious
acts.68
For example, in General Insurance Company of America
v. Faulkner,6 9 the insurance company had sued the parents of
an eleven year old boy as subrogee of their insured, a
school. 70 The boy was alleged to have "maliciously and will-
fully" set fire to curtains in the school auditorium, resulting
in damages of nearly $3,000, which the insurance company
had paid to the school under the terms of the insurance pol-
icy.71 The insurance company sought to recover $500 (the lia-
bility limit) from the parents, jointly and severally, under the
state's parental tort liability statute.7 2 Defendant parents
had challenged the complaint on constitutional and other
grounds, and the lower court had dismissed the action.78
On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina found
the statute was constitutional, and did not deprive the par-
ents of their property without due process of law under the
state constitution.74 It further found that the complaint did
not need to allege facts showing any act or omission by the
66. See Geis & Binder, supra note 27, at 311.
67. See discussion infra notes 69-89.
68. See discussion infra notes 69-89.
69. 130 S.E.2d 645 (N.C. 1963).
70. Id at 646-47.
71. Id. at 647.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 650. The parents did not effectively raise a federal constitutional
issue, because they erroneously relied on the 5th Amendment and not the 14th
Amendment for their constitutional claim; the court held that the 5th Amend-
ment did not apply to limit state action. See id.
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parents, since the state imposed vicarious liability upon them
for the acts of their child.75
In its decision, the court mentioned the trend in the
United States toward expanding the common law liability of
parents, and discussed the rationale behind the vicarious pa-
rental liability statutes adopted in North Carolina and other
states:
[The North Carolina statute], and similar statutes, ap-
pear to have been adopted not out of consideration for pro-
viding a restorative compensation for the victims of injuri-
ous or tortious conduct of children, but as an aid in the
control of juvenile delinquency .... [The North Carolina
statute's] rationale apparently is that parental indiffer-
ence and failure to supervise the activities of children is
one of the major causes of juvenile delinquency; that pa-
rental liability for harm done by children will stimulate
attention and supervision; and that the total effect will be
the reduction in the anti-social behavior of children.76
In Hayward v. Ramick,7 7 the Supreme Court of Georgia
held that the vicarious parental liability statute adopted by
Georgia in 197678 was constitutional, against a claim by the
parents that the statute violated the substantive due process
clauses of both the federal and state constitutions because it
imposed vicarious liability upon them for the acts of their
child. In that case, the complaint alleged that the appellant/
defendants' sons had burglarized appellee/plaintiffs home,
causing property damage. At trial, the jury had found in
favor of plaintiff, awarding damages against the boys, and
also against each parent under the parental liability
statute.79
The court on appeal affirmed and found that the "express
intent" of the statute was to aid in controlling delinquency,
75. Id.
76. General Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, 130 S.E.2d 645, 650 (N.C. 1963).
77. 285 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
78. The 1976 version of the Georgia statute stated, in part: "[Elvery parent
... having in custody and control over a minor child or children under the age of
18 shall be liable in an amount not to exceed Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) for
the willful or malicious acts of said minor child or children resulting in damage
to the property of another...." Id. at 698, citing Georgia Parental Liability for
Minor Children's Torts Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-13 (1976).
79. See Hayward, 285 S.E.2d 697.
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not to compensate victims for the acts of children. 0 Applying
a rational basis test, the court held that the statute was not
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious; that it was rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose; and that it there-
fore did not violate substantive due process: "We further hold
that the state has a legitimate interest in the subject (control-
ling juvenile delinquency), and that there is a rational rela-
tionship between the means used (imposing of liability upon
parents of children who willfully or maliciously damage prop-
erty) and this object [sic].""1
In a Connecticut case, Watson v. Gradzik, 2 which upheld
the constitutionality of that state's vicarious parental tort lia-
bility statute, the court stated that the rationale behind the
statute was both to control juvenile delinquency and to com-
pensate victims of damages caused by minors.8 3 In Watson,
plaintiff had brought suit against the parents of a minor for
wrongful conversion. The parents demurred on the ground
that the vicarious parental liability statute was
unconstitutional.8 4
The parents claimed that imposition of vicarious tort lia-
bility upon them interfered with their fundamental right to
bear and raise children.8 5 The court reasoned that because
parents in Connecticut have the authority, by case law, to
compel their children's obedience "in all matters,"86 "it would
not seem unreasonable to hold them responsible for exercis-
ing that authority".8 7
The court further found that the parents had not met
their burden of proving that the statute was not reasonably
related to the dual purposes of controlling juvenile delin-
80. See id. The statute under scrutiny was enacted in 1976. A prior vicari-
ous parental liability statute had previously been held unconstitutional, in part
because the Georgia court felt that if the statute was compensatory in nature
(there were no liability limits), it violated substantive due process; that case
hinted that if the recovery was limited and in the nature of a penalty, there
would not be a constitutional problem. See id., citing Corley v. Lewless, 182
S.E.2d 766 (Ga. 1971). The court in Hayward suggested that the expression of
legislative intent was to comply with standards developed in the Corley case.
See Hayward, 285 S.E.2d at 697.
81. Hayward, 285 S.E.2d at 699.
82. 373 A.2d 191 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977).
83. See id. at 193.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 192.
86. Id., quoting State v. Hughes, 209 A.2d 872, 879 (1965).
87. Id. at 192.
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quency and compensating the victims of child tortfeasors8s
Without discussion of the evidence which the parents might
have offered to meet their burden of proof, the court com-
mented that similar statutes had been held constitutional in
many jurisdictions.8 9 It quoted with approval from law re-
view articles cited by courts of other states which argued that
the use of vicarious parental liability statutes to compensate
innocent victims of children's torts was fair and reasonable,
either because the parents might be at least in part responsi-
ble for the child's act, or because, even if entirely without
fault, it was more fair to have the parents bear the loss than
an innocent tort victim.90
As to the second alleged purpose of the Connecticut stat-
ute-that of controlling juvenile delinquency-the court gave
only its bare conclusion, without discussion or analysis, that
the statute bore a rational relationship to a legitimate public
purpose. 9' Interestingly, the court did not explore the avail-
able legislative history, which clearly indicated that a major
factor in adopting the Connecticut statute was the reduction
of juvenile delinquency.92
As these examples suggest, a significant, if not primary,
reason for the vicarious parental tort liability statutes ap-
pears to be the reduction of juvenile delinquency by making
88. See Watson v. Gradzik, 373 A.2d 191 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977).
89. See id. at 192.
90. See id. at 193, citing General Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, citing Kelly v. Wil-
liams, 346 S.W.2d 434, 437-38 (Tex. Cir. App. 1961), quoting Burchard V. Mar-
tin, Comment, Parent & Child-Civil Responsibility of Parents for the Torts of
Children-Statutory Imposition of Strict Liability, 3 VILL. L. REV. 529 (1958).
91. See Watson v. Gradzik, 373 A.2d at 193.
92. See id. at 193. Statements by the state senators in the hearings on Con-
necticut's vicarious liability statute before it was adopted in 1955 are revealing.
One legislator stated: "I believe that such a bill will make the parents more
alert and give a little bit more attention and a little bit more supervision in
upbring [sic] their children." Wilhelm, supra note 49, at 111 n.68, citing Liabil-
ity of Parents for Damage by Children: Hearings on Cal. 545 Sub. for H.B. No.
71, 1955 Sess. 978 (Conn. 1955).
Another said:
I don't think there is such a thing as juvenile delinquency. I think
there is only adult delinquency. It is appalling how parents completely
neglect their children and the problem children that come in and are
branded as juvenile delinquents . . . . This bill . . . is merely an at-
tempt to get at this adult delinquency. . .. I would like to approachjuvenile delinquency by putting the finger where it belongs and that is
on the parents. . . who should be responsible.
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parents responsible for their children's acts, not the compen-
sation of the victims, nor the punishment of the parents.
4. Has Imposing Parental Tort Liability Resulted in a
Reduction in Juvenile Delinquency?
Interestingly, despite the consistent rationale for enact-
ing and enforcing parental tort liability statutes as a means
of reducing juvenile delinquency, there is little evidence that
the enactment of such legislation has, in fact, resulted in the
reduction of juvenile delinquency. Only one study has been
found which even addresses this question; it suggests the en-
actment of parental liability statutes does not result in a re-
duction in juvenile delinquency.93 This study has been criti-
cized as being significantly flawed in its structure and
analysis.94 Certainly, the alternative rationale of requiring
parents, as opposed to third party victims, to absorb the loss
caused by the delinquent acts of children appears justifiable
upon public policy grounds.95 However, since most of the
statutes do not provide for recovery based upon the damages
proved, the victim may be achieving only a symbolic victory,
unless the actual damages are within the restricted statutory
limits.
Thus, the main purpose of parental tort liability statutes
appears to be the reduction of juvenile delinquency. How-
ever, it is clear that under these statutes tort liability of a
parent is not based on the parent's knowledge or action, but
only on the existence of the parent-child relationship (where
the child is in the custody of the parent). Liability is there-
fore imposed upon parents, essentially presuming that they
have the ability to control their child and prevent the delin-
quent acts, but have failed to do so. This analysis implies
that there is a universally applicable model of parental super-
vision and control which, if utilized by the parent, will result
in a reduction or elimination of juvenile delinquent acts by
the child. It further ignores the possibility that other factors
93. See Wilhelm, supra note 49, at 137-38. Actually, the "study" was of data
available from the Federal Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare analyzed by
Alice B. Freer in her Law review article Parental Liability for Torts of Children,
53 Ky. L. J. 255, 264-65 (1965).
94. See id.
95. See id. at 114.
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besides parental supervision and control may, in fact, be the
most significant causes of the child's behavior.
What if the child is effectively beyond the parent's con-
trol, for whatever reason, even if living with that parent and
legally in the parent's custody? As to vicarious tort parental
liability, the answer may be that even if juvenile delinquency
is not being controlled by imposing parental tort liability,
holding the parent financially responsible at least partially
compensates an innocent victim of the child's acts. The com-
pensation of the victim does not, however, explain the imposi-
tion upon parents of criminal liability related to their chil-
dren's delinquency. For criminal liability to be imposed, the
parent's own intent and action or failure to act are critical;
but the rationale of controlling juvenile liability by punishing
the parent (this time with criminal sanctions) appears consis-
tent with the tort liability statutes.
B. Parental Liability for Status Offenses and "Criminal"
Acts of Juvenile Delinquency: An Effort to Reduce
Juvenile Delinquency by Criminal Punishment
Statutory criminal liability in connection with a child's
juvenile delinquency is only imposed upon parents where the
parent is proved to have had the requisite criminal intent and
to have "caused" the child's delinquent act.96 Thus, the con-
nection between the parent's poor parenting and the child's
delinquent act must be established before the parent can be
convicted under the criminal liability laws, unlike the vicari-
ous tort liability statutes.
1. Common Law Limited Criminal Liability
for Parents
At common law, parents were not responsible for the in-
dependent criminal acts of their children. Only if the chil-
dren were found to have acted as "agents" for the parents
(making the parents principals), could the parents be
prosecuted.97
96. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
97. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Keenan, 25 N.E. 32 (Mass. 1890) (conviction
of father reversed where evidence showed son did not sell liquor at his direc-
tion); Commonwealth v. Slavski, 140 N.E. 465 (Mass. 1923) (conviction of father
affirmed where evidence showed son sold liquor in home "under control" of fa-
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2. Statutory Expansion of Parental Criminal Liability
State statutory laws in many jurisdictions have ex-
panded the criminal liability of parents for their children's
acts. Unlike the parental tort liability statutes, where a par-
ent is typically made vicariously liable for his or her child's
intentional or reckless acts merely because of the parent/
child relationship, the criminal statutes either on their face
or by judicial interpretation typically require the element of
mens rea (criminal intent)9 or criminal negligence99 by the
parent, and further require that the parent's act or failure to
act be a proximate cause' °° of the child's act.' 1
Although various states have enacted specific statutes
making parents criminally liable where their children com-
mit acts of juvenile delinquency while operating a vehicle, in
possession of a firearm, or in other specific situations,'0 2 the
discussion below is limited to the most common types of stat-
utes or ordinances which impose criminal liability upon a
parent in connection with the juvenile delinquency of his or
her child.
The first two categories, truancy and curfew laws, gener-
ally impose criminal liability on a parent who knowingly al-
lows his or her child to commit acts (staying out past an es-
tablished curfew; not attending school) which would not be
criminal if committed by an adult. 10 3 As to the child, truancy
and curfew violations are generally termed "status offenses,"
because the child can be brought before the juvenile court and
adjudged delinquent for these acts, whereas there would be
no chargeable offense at all if the child were an adult; prose-
cution is based solely upon the child's "status" as a minor. 104
ther); State v. Leonard, 41 Vt. 585 (1869) (father convicted of burglary where
children did acts at his direction).
98. See generally ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW
826-40 (3rd ed. 1982).
99. Id. at 840-51.
100. Id. at 774-85.
101. See, e.g., Seleina v. Seleina, 93 N.Y.S.2d 42 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1949)
("contributing" statute); McCollester V. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046 (N.H.
1981) (curfew); In Re Jeanette L., 523 A.2d 1048 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987)
(truancy).
102. See generally Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, Criminal Responsi-
bility of Parent for Act of Child, 12 A.L.R. 4TH 633-700 (1994).
103. See infra Part III.B.3-4.
104. See ARNOLD BINDER, GILBERT GEIS & DICKSON BRUCE, JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY: HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 9, 532-39 (1988).
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The third category of laws discussed below, under which
parental criminal liability can be incurred in connection with
the juvenile delinquency of a child, are the so-called "contrib-
uting" statutes.1°5 These are the laws, enacted in virtually
every jurisdiction in the United States, which make adults
(including parents) criminally liable for contributing to the
delinquency of a minor. 106
Finally, the recent trend toward broad local ordinances
which impose criminal (and sometimes civil) liability upon
parents for a variety of acts by their children, is discussed. 10 7
The analysis below of the criminal parental liability imposed
under truancy laws, curfew ordinances, "contributing" stat-
utes, and recently enacted local parental liability ordinances
indicates that, like the tort liability statutes, a primary pur-
pose of these laws has been to control juvenile delinquency by
punishing, or threatening to punish, parents for the juvenile
delinquency of their children. 10
3. Truancy Laws: Parental Liability for the Purpose of
Controlling a Child's Truancy
State compulsory school attendance laws, which typically
include provisions that punish parents, guardians or others
having custody and control of a child for that child's failure to
attend school, had been enacted in at least some states by the
1920's,1°9 and have generally been upheld as
constitutional. 10
The United States Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters"' found that an Oregon truancy statute requiring all
children to attend public schools was unconstitutional, but
the court confirmed the power of the state to require children
to attend school, generally: "No question is raised concerning
the power of the state reasonably to regulate all schools, to
inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and
105. See infra Part III.B.5.
106. See infra Part III.B.5.
107. See infra Part III.B.6.
108. See infra Part III.B.3-5.
109. See, e.g.,. State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730 (Ind. 1901); State v. Hoyt, 146 A.
170 (N.H. 1929); Parr v. State, 157 N.E. 555 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. Ohio 1927);
State v. Williams, 228 N.W. 470 (S.D. 1929).
110. See, e.g., People v. Turner, 263 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1953), appeal dismissed,
347 U.S. 972 (1953); State v. Hoyt, 146 A. 170 (N.H. 1929); Stephens v. Bongart,
189 A. 131 (N.J. 1937); Williams, 228 N.W. 470; Parr, 157 N.E. 555.
111. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some
school .... "112
Emphasizing the importance of the parent's role in di-
recting the child's education, the Supreme Court in Pierce
stated: "The child is not the mere creature of the state: those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, cou-
pled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for ad-
ditional obligations." l1 3 Since truancy statutes have uni-
formly been upheld as constitutional where the state
provided for some alternative to public schooling, the courts
have typically summarily disposed of any constitutional
attacks. 114
The wording of the state statutes typically only makes
the parent or guardian responsible where the child is under
his or her "custody" and/or "control."1 15 This makes sense,
since criminally liability can only be imposed where the par-
ent's actions (or failure to act) are found to have been a proxi-
mate cause of the child's delinquent act, which could not be
the case if the child was not found to be "under" that parent's
custody and control. In fact, most of the reported cases ap-
pear to be cases where the child's truancy was not just pas-
sively tolerated, but was actively encouraged, by the parent,
who was found to have kept the child home from school,
either for religious reasons, 116 or because the parent claimed
112. Id. at 534 (emphasis added), quoted with approval in People v. Turner,
263 P.2d 685, 687 (Cal. 1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1953).
113. Id. at 535, quoted with approval in State v. Williams, 228 N.W. 470,
471 (S.D. 1929).
114. See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730 (Ind. 1901); Stephens v. Bongart,
189 A. 131 (N.J. 1937); Williams, 228 N.W. 470.
115. See, e.g., Williams, 228 N.W. 470 (quoting the North Dakota truancy
statute as stating: "Every person having under his control a child of the age of
eight years and not exceeding the age of seventeen years, shall annually cause
such child to regularly attend some . . . school . . . ."); Bongart, 189 A. 131
(quoting the New Jersey truancy statute as stating: "Every parent, guardian or
other person having custody and control of a child between the ages of seven
and sixteen years shall cause such child regularly to attend the public schools.
. .or to attend a day school . . . or to receive equivalent instruction elsewhere
that at school . . .).
116. See, e.g., cases cited in Eichelberger, supra note 102, at 686-90. In Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Supreme Court held that Amish par-
ents were not required to send their children to school until 16 years of age
where to do so conflicted with the First Amendment free exercise of religion
clause.
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to be schooling the child at home (often because of religious
convictions). 117
In the reported cases which have either considered the
constitutionality of truancy statutes which impose parental
criminal liability for the child's truancy, or which have ap-
plied such statutes to prosecute parents, the courts generally
do not discuss the legislative rationale behind the parental
liability provision.' However, the general emphasis given
in the cases to the parent's duty to educate her or his child,
and to the state's power to compel such education, leads inev-
itably to the conclusion that the rationale behind these laws
imposing criminal liability upon a parent for truancy by his
or her child is not retributive. The rationale is to deter tru-
ancy by punishing (or threatening to punish) a parent who
does not make his or her child go to school.
One case which does explicitly address the rationale be-
hind the criminal parental liability section of a truancy stat-
ute is People v. Turner." 9 In that case, defendants had been
convicted for failing to send their three children to school.' 20
They appealed, claiming that the statute unconstitutionally
deprived them of the their right "to how and where their chil-
dren may be educated."' 2 1 The court held that the statute
was constitutional, and that the state acted within its powers
in regulating private schooling as an alternative to public
schooling, commenting that its review of the cases in other
states did not discover any case where a compulsory attend-
ance statute was held unconstitutional for failing to recognize
home instruction as an alternative to attendance in the pub-
lic schools.' 22
In Turner, home instruction was allowed under the stat-
ute, but the parents had not met the statutory requirements
for home instruction; in particular, that the private tutor
have a state teaching certificate.123 The court held that such
117. See, e.g., Bongart, 189 A. 131; People v. Turner, 263 P.2d 685 (Cal.
1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1953); see also Eichelberger supra note
102, at 688, 690-91, 693-95.
118. See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730 (Ind. 1901); State v. Hoyt, 146 A.
170 (N.H. 1929); Parr v. State, 157 N.E. 555 (Ohio 1927); Williams, 228 N.W.
470.
119. 263 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1953).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 687.




statutory requirements were reasonable. 124 Discussing the
rationale for the truancy statute, the court stated: "While the
ultimate object of the statute is the education of the child,
means to assure the attainment of that end may be adopted by
the state, and may be enforced by the imposition of penalties
for violating the regulations made."
1 25
Only one reported case has been found where the parent
claimed that she did not have "control" over the child. In that
case, In Re Jeannette L., 126 the Maryland Court of Special Ap-
peals discussed the rationale behind the parental liability
provision of the state's compulsory school attendance statute
in reviewing the conviction in the juvenile court of two
mothers accused of causing their children's truancy.
127
In its statement of facts, the appellate court stated that
one of the appellants had testified "that the reason for the
daughters' nonattendance at school were her state of health,
lack of cooperation from her children, and her inability to
control their conduct."' 2 s In addition, that appellant had
claimed her daughters were often sick, and that she had no
transportation and so could not pick them up early from
school.129
The appellant mothers had been convicted after jury tri-
als, which they had requested. 130 Their appeal was based on
several grounds, including the unconstitutionality of the
Maryland truancy law, and the insufficiency of the evi-
dence. 13 ' Holding that the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague, the court specifically held that the statute did not at-
tempt to impose strict liability on parents for their children's
truancy:
The statute does not subject a parent to prosecution
for the actions of his or her children, but it does sanction
prosecution for the parent's own acts. Before a person
may be found guilty of violating [the truancy statute], the
court must find: 1) the person had control over the child
124. See id. at 688-89.
125. People v. Turner, 263 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1953) (emphasis added), ap-
peal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1953).
126. 523 A.2d 1048 (Md. 1987).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1050.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 1050.
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and 2) failed to see that the child attended school
regularly.
The statute imposes an affirmative duty on persons
who have control over a child .... That duty is to assure
that the child attends school regularly. Failure to perform
that duty is a violation of the statute. Passive acquies-
cence in the child's nonattendance of school is no
defense. 132
The court upheld the mothers' convictions under the Mary-
land truancy law: the jury at trial apparently had not be-
lieved the one defendant's claim that her children were be-
yond her control.133
However, it is not difficult to imagine a situation where a
teenager, still a minor and in the legal custody of his or her
parent, is in fact beyond the control of the parent, although
the parent knows or suspects the child is skipping school. In
that case, one might ask, what actions does the parent have
to take to avoid "passive acquiescence" in the truancy which
might subject that parent to criminal liability?
For example, if the parent's child is a sixteen year old
who habitually disobeys the parent and may even be physi-
cally abusive to the parent, what acts could the parent do to
show he or she has attempted to exercise control over the
child and failed?13 1 What if, as one of the mothers in In Re
Jeanette L. claimed, the parent does not have adequate trans-
portation to give her flexibility in taking or picking up a sick
child from school, perhaps for economic reasons? Similar
questions regarding the usefulness of parental liability laws
in controlling juvenile acts may arise regarding the criminal
liability of a parent for the curfew violations by his or her
child, as discussed below.
132. In Re Jeannette L., 523 A.2d at 1055.
133. See id. at 1051.
134. See, e.g., Ann Landers, Some Kids Just Can't Be Controlled, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 1996, at E5R, where a parent wrote in a letter to the columnist:
It may seem unbelievable, Ann, but some children simply cannot be
controlled. We had a daughter whom we sent off to school in the morn-
ing, but she never got there. Instead, she joined her boyfriend ....
I cannot tell you how many people we turned to for help with this prob-
lem. Finally, two kind, understanding school counselors told us there
was nothing we could do. What good would it have done to put us intojail? The boyfriend's mother had the same problem. Her son would




4. Curfew Laws: Parental Liability for the Purpose of
Controlling a Child's Curfew Violations
Curfew laws typically provide that it is unlawful for cer-
tain persons (often limited to minors, or minors of specific
ages) to be in certain places (for example, the public streets
and public buildings) at night, without being accompanied by
a parent, guardian or other responsible adult, or without a
reasonable excuse. 135 These laws are typically enacted by
municipalities as local ordinances and not by the state as
statutes.'3 6 Curfews imposed upon juveniles gained popular-
ity in the United States beginning in the late nineteenth cen-
tury: by the late 1950's about 48 cities with populations over
100,000 were found not only to have such ordinances, but also
to be enforcing them."8 7
Most curfew ordinances impose parental responsibility
for the child's compliance with the curfew. 138 There appear to
be only a handful of reported cases dealing with criminal pa-
rental liability imposed under curfew ordinances. 139 As in
most of the decisions in the truancy cases, the courts scruti-
nizing parental liability under the curfew laws do not discuss
the rationale for punishing the parents of minors violating
curfews, except indirectly in the discussion of the rationale
for the curfew laws, generally.
For example, in People v. Walton, 140 the district attorney
appealed the dismissal of a complaint against a father
charged with having allowed his sixteen year old son to vio-
late the curfew ordinances.' 4 ' The lower court had dismissed
the complaint, finding that the curfew ordinances in question
135. See, e.g., People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498 (Cal. 1945); Eastlake v. Rug-
giero, 22 N.E.2d 126 (Ct. App. Ohio 1966). However, at least one city in Orange
County, California, has enacted curfew ordinances which restrict children's
movements during the daytime. See Cathy Werblin, Seal Beach Daytime Cur-
few Approved, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1996, at B5A.
136. Ruggiero, 220 N.E.2d 126.
137. See id. at 127-28. Nine jurisdictions apparently had curfew ordinances,
but were not enforcing them. See id.
138. See id. at 128.
139. See, e.g., McCollester v. City of Keene, N.H., 514 F. Supp. 1046 (N.H.
1981); People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1945); Rug-
giero, 220 N.E.2d 126.
140. 161 P.2d 498 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1945).
141. See id. at 499-500.
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violated both the state and federal constitutions and were
void. 142
On appeal, the court in Walton found that the defendant
father only had standing to attack the provisions of the ordi-
nances which imposed criminal liability upon a parent who
allowed or permitted her or his minor child to violate the cur-
few law. Considering those provisions only, the court held
that they were constitutional. The court stated: "[Ilt is well
settled that minors constitute a class founded upon a natural
and intrinsic distinction from adults; that legislation pecu-
liarly applicable to them is necessary for their proper protec-
tion and when induced by rational considerations looking to
that end its validity may not be challenged." 43
The court offered no additional rationale for the imposi-
tion upon a parent of criminal liability for the curfew viola-
tion by his or her child: it can be inferred that the court con-
sidered such punishment not as retributive, but as part of a
rational scheme by the legislature for the "proper protection"
of minors.1 4 Thus, the reason parents are punished appears
to be to encourage them to control or supervise their children
adequately, so that curfew violations will not occur.
In another case, City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero,145 a curfew
ordinance which contained a provision imposing criminal pa-
rental liability was challenged upon constitutional grounds
"because it is unduly restrictive of personal freedoms."' 46 In
holding the ordinance constitutional, the court stated:
We feel that curfew ordinances for minors are justified as
necessary police regulations to control the presence ofjuveniles in public places at nighttime with the attendant
risk of mischief, and that such ordinances promote the
safety and good order of the community by reducing the
incidence of juvenile criminal activity. 147
In Eastlake, as in Walton, the court's opinion did not ar-
ticulate a distinct rationale for the criminal parental liability
portion of the curfew ordinance; the rationale given for the
curfew ordinance in its entirety (including the parental liabil-
142. See id. at 499.
143. Id. at 501.
144. See id.
145. 220 N.E.2d 126 (Ohio 1966).
146. Id. at 127.
147. Id. at 128.
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ity provision) was to prevent juvenile "mischief' and juvenile
criminal activity at night. 148 The parental liability provision
in this curfew ordinance supports the rationale of preventing
juvenile "mischief' only if the assumption is made that appro-
priate parental control of a child will stop the curfew viola-
tions by that child. In upholding the constitutionality of the
parental liability provision in the curfew ordinance, the court
in Eastlake must have made this assumption, although its
opinion does not articulate it.
Finally, in McCollester v. City of Keene,'149 a case which
held a curfew ordinance to be an unconstitutional restriction
of the liberty interest of minors, 150 the court discussed the
legislative intent behind the enactment of the ordinance:
Although antisocial activity was the purpose of adopting
the ordinance stated in the preamble [of the ordi-
nance]... , there are indications in the record that the
safety and general welfare of vulnerable, impressionable
minors was an unstated purpose in the minds of several of
the legislators when the ordinance was being
considered. 151
In McCollester, the rationale behind the provision provid-
ing for parental criminal liability was not specifically ad-
dressed by the adopting legislators, either in their written
preamble to the ordinance itself or in their affidavits submit-
ted to the trial court.152 Presumably then, the reason for im-
posing criminal liability upon a parent for his or her child's
curfew violation was the same reason given for adoption of
the curfew ordinance generally: preventing antisocial activity
and protecting minors.
Thus, the parental liability provisions of the curfew laws,
like those provisions of the truancy laws, appear to have been
enacted for the purpose of reducing juvenile delinquency by
punishing, or threatening to punish, parents who do not effec-
tively control their children. This rationale in turn presumes
that parents generally will have the ability and means to con-
trol their children, particularly adolescent children, who
otherwise might violate the curfew.
148. Id.
149. 514 F. Supp. 1046 (N.H. 1981).
150. See id. at 1053.
151. Id. at 1050, referring to certain affidavits attached to the defendant's
opposition to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
152. See McCollester, 514 F. Supp. 1046.
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5. Contributing Statutes: Parental Liability for the
Purpose of Controlling Other Acts of Juvenile
Delinquency
The first state to enact a statute which in general terms
made it a crime to contribute to the delinquency of a minor
was Colorado, in 1903.153 Other states soon followed suit."'
By 1961, one author claimed 48 states had "contributing"
statutes.'55 In 1983, another author claimed 42 states had
"contributing" statutes. 156
In contrast to the truancy and curfew laws, so-called
"contributing" statutes do not limit the class of persons who
can be charged and convicted to the parent, guardian of a mi-
nor child, or other person having custody and control of the
child; any adult is subject to the law. In fact, to the layperson
the phrase "contributing to the delinquency of a minor" is
most likely to suggest an adult enticing an unrelated minor
into committing illegal acts (sex, use of drugs, use of alcohol,
stealing, etc.), not deficient parenting.
In the few cases where parents have actually been prose-
cuted for contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and the
case has been reported, the courts have not addressed the re-
lationship between parenting and the child's delinquency in
any detailed way.1 57 However, these cases do suggest that
the main purpose of the contributing statutes is the reduction
of juvenile delinquency.15 Punishing parents and others is
thus presumed to have a deterrent affect on the actions of
those persons, where they have "caused" the child's delin-
quency, or, in some statutes, the child's "tendency" to become
delinquent.
153. See James A. Kenny & James V. Kenny, Shall We Punish the Parents?,
47 A.B.A. J. 804, 805 (Aug. 1961).
154. See, e.g., Mill v. Brown, 88 P. 609 (Utah 1907) (holding part of Utah
contributing statute unconstitutional which based parental liability on juvenile
offender status of the child without more); People v. De Leon, 170 P. 173 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1918), reh'g denied, Jan. 31, 1918 (upholding conviction under
contributing statute of nonparent cafe manager for serving liquor to a minor).
155. See Kenny & Kenny, supra note 153, at 805.
156. See Geis & Binder, supra note 27, citing Peter D. Garlock, Contributing
to the Delinquency of Minors, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 240 (S. Kad-
ish, ed. 1983).
157. See discussion infra notes 159-70.
158. See discussion infra notes 159-70.
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For example, in State v. Gans,'5 9 defendants were the
adoptive parents of a minor (laughter, age eleven. They had
transported her from Ohio to West Virginia, and there con-
sented to her marriage, and consented to her misrepresenta-
tion of her age in securing a marriage license. 160 After a jury
trial, they had been found guilty of contributing to the delin-
quency of their daughter, and appealed.161 On appeal, the
court conceded that the daughter had not been adjudicated a
delinquent child: however, under the Ohio statute, a person
could be prosecuted for acting "in a way tending to cause
delinquency."162
After admitting that the validity of the child's marriage
was not at issue, the court proceeded with a lengthy discus-
sion of the public policy considerations in Ohio against mar-
riages by minor females under sixteen years of age.' 63 It then
hypothesized that because of her responsibilities as a home-
maker and wife, the girl might not attend school as required
by Ohio's compulsory attendance law. 164 It then concluded
that the jury could, on the basis of the evidence before it, con-
clude that the parents' acts in facilitating their daughter's
marriage would tend to cause her to become a delinquent.
65
Regarding the rationale behind the contributing statute,
particularly the clause allowing the prosecution of persons for
contributing to the delinquency of a child who had not been
found to be delinquent, the court stated:
It is apparent that the purpose of that clause is to prevent
a delinquency before it occurs rather than to await such
delinquency and then punish the adult offender. The pur-
pose of the clause is to avoid the undesirable result which
might arise if an adult is permitted to pursue a course of
conduct which tends to cause a child to become a delin-
quent. It is the old theory of preventative medicine. A
disease is much easier to prevent than to cure. 1
6 6
One reported contributing case at the trial court level of-
fers some interesting insights into the reasoning of a trial
159. 151 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio 1958).
160. See id at 711.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 711-13.
164. See id. at 713-14.
165. See State v. Gans, 151 N.E.2d at 714.
166. Id. at 710.
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judge regarding the purposes of a specific contributing stat-
ute as applied to a parent, and the general connection be-
tween parenting and juvenile delinquency. In Seleina v.
Seleina,167 a 1949 New York case where the trial decision was
reported, a mother had alleged that her husband had contrib-
uted to the delinquency of their eleven year old minor daugh-
ter by encouraging the daughter to disobey the mother. The
trial court found that the daughter was delinquent, in that
she had become aggressive, showed disrespect for her mother
and other adults, had stayed away from her home for one and
a half days, and had stolen money on several occasions.16 s
The court in its opinion, discussed the judge's personal opin-
ion regarding the causes of juvenile delinquency:
I am grateful that these [delinquent] children are not
regarded as criminals. They are just offenders who are to
be helped to become decent human beings. I have yet to
find, except in very rare instances, that children had be-
come delinquent because of any reason other than neglect
either by the schools, by the churches, by the community,
or as in most instances, by the parents .... Punishment
does act as a deterrent. As to that there can be no doubt
.... In this instance I think the man [the convicted fa-
ther] ought to be removed from the community for some
time. Possibly such confinement might help him to realize
his own conduct and what he has done to his own child,
and in that way make a better man out of him and a good
father to his children. 16 9
Recently, particularly at the local level, laws have been
adopted which reflect the rationale of the trial judge in the
1949 Seleina case: if parents are punished, or threatened
with punishment, they will become "good" parents to avoid
such punishment. "Good" parents exercise appropriate "con-
trol" over their children, and such children do not commit
acts of juvenile delinquency. Although often not reported in
the case law, recent articles in the popular press and a notori-
ous California case suggest that criminal parental liability
laws have recently had a surge of popularity as a "new" re-
sponse to the juvenile delinquency problem.' 70
167. 93 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1949).
168. See id. at 44.
169. Id. at 44-45.
170. See discussion infra Part III.B.6. and Part IV.
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6. A Trend?: Local "Parental Responsibility" Statutes
in the 1990s
Local ordinances to create parental responsibility are not
new: parental liability clauses in curfew ordinances have
been typically included in such local laws since the 1950's in
the United States.171 However, on occasion, local communi-
ties have enacted broader parental liability ordinances, usu-
ally imposing criminal liability for a variety of acts by
children.
Only one appellate case, decided in 1976, has analyzed
such a broad, local parental liability ordinance. In that case,
Doe v. City of Trenton,172 the court held that the ordinance in
question was unconstitutional, violating the 14th Amend-
ment due process clause. 1 73 The court's analysis suggests
that such ordinances may be held unconstitutional if they at-
tempt to impose what is in essence vicarious criminal liabil-
ity upon parents for their children's acts.1
7 4
The New Jersey city ordinance under consideration in
the Trenton case contained a legal presumption that the par-
ent was responsible for the child's delinquency where his or
her child was twice in one year "adjudged guilty of acts de-
"1175 atfined as violations of the public peace. These acts in
cluded "adjudications for delinquency and of the status of be-
"1176Thsing a juvenile delinquent in need of supervision. Thus,
under this ordinance, the prosecution did not have to prove
the parent's mens rea or the causation element usually re-
quired for a criminal conviction of a parent in connection with
the juvenile delinquency of his or her child.
The Trenton court, in its constitutional analysis of the ev-
identiary presumption, questioned the link between parent-
ing and juvenile delinquency which has been so readily ac-
cepted as "rational," without comment or scrutiny, by most
other courts analyzing either tort or criminal parental liabil-
ity statutes.1 77
171. See discussion supra Part III.B.4.
172. 362 A.2d 1200 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1202.
176. Id.
177. See cases discussed supra Parts III.A and B. Although courts in both
the civil and criminal cases have tested the constitutional soundness of paren-
tal liability statutes using the rational basis test, that test differs in its applica-
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In Trenton, the court commented that "[t]he roots ofjuve-
nile misconduct are complex and imperfectly understood." 7s
The court ultimately concluded that it was not "more likely
than not" that the child's second adjudication for a breach of
the public peace was "the result of parental action or inac-
tion."179 The court discussed the relationship between the ac-
tions of parents and juvenile delinquency as follows:
If there is a consensus at all in the field, it is on the propo-
sition that children growing up in urban poverty areas are
those most likely to be identified as juvenile delinquents.
The City of Trenton provides us with nothing which would
support a finding that parental influence is an overriding
cause of juvenile misconduct .... By contrast, plaintiff and
amicus Public Advocate provide a representative sam-
pling of prevailing expert opinion, research and analysis
tending to support the conclusion that parental actions
are but a single factor in the interaction of forces produc-
ing juvenile misconduct.180
Despite the concerns expressed more than twenty years
ago by the court in the Trenton case regarding the efficacy of
using parental liability statutes to control juvenile delin-
quency, local governments in the 1990s have turned to such
laws, in various forms, in an attempt to control what is per-
ceived as an epidemic of juvenile crime and violence.' 8
tion, depending on the case setting. Thus, the court's analysis of whether a
legitimate legislative end (controlling juvenile delinquency) is achieved through
a rational means (punishing parents) will differ depending upon whether the
law in question imposes tort damages or criminal penalties. In the Trenton
case, it is not surprising that the legislative means would be most carefully
scrutinized by the court, since the effect of the evidentiary presumptions cre-
ated by the parental liability statute in that case was to shift the burden of
proof on the critical elements of mens rea and causation to the defendant in a
criminal prosecution. See Trenton, 362 A.2d 1200.
178. Trenton, 362 A.2d at 1203.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citations omitted). The court refers to an analysis of the factors
affecting juvenile delinquency in Penelope D. Clute, Comment, Parental Re-
sponsibility Ordinances-Is Criminalizing Parents When Children Commit Un-
lawful Acts a Solution to Juvenile Delinquency?, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1551 (1973),
and also mentions that one author had found that the delinquency rate did not
change after similar criminal parental liability statutes had been enacted, cit-
ing SOL RuBIN, CRIME AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 22 (1970).
181. See Barry Siegel, Town Tries to Police the Parents, L. A. TIMEs, Apr. 21,
1996, at Al (parental responsibility ordinance adopted in St. Clair Shores,
Michigan in 1994 which provided for both civil damages and criminal penalties
including fine or imprisonment); Chuck Haga, Farmington May Fine Parents
for Kids' Misbehavior, STAR TRIB., June 22, 1996 at Al (proposed parental crim-
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There are no appellate cases which "test" the constitutional-
ity of these recent ordinances. Articles in the popular press
suggest that convictions under such statutes are rare, and
that they are used as a threat to encourage parents to control
their children.'" 2
Even if such ordinances survive constitutional attack be-
cause they require, unlike the law under scrutiny in the Tren-
ton case, that the parent have both knowledge of the child's
behavior (mens rea) and the ability to control the child's be-
havior (causation), the uses of such ordinances to effectively
control juvenile delinquency is still questionable. As with the
tort liability statutes, a troubling question arises when the
child is an older adolescent: to what extent is a parent ex-
pected to "control" an unruly teenager? What actions by the
parent are sufficient to show reasonable attempts to control a
child? And, if such reasonable attempts fail, should the par-
ent still be punished?
For example, what if a father is smaller than his sixteen
year old son, who he knows has committed a series of local
house burglaries and other delinquent acts? If he confronts
the son regarding his actions, and is physically assaulted by
him, is he required to continue efforts to "control" his
child? 183
Given the difficulty of obtaining a criminal conviction
against a parent because of the requirements of mens rea and
causation, and the reluctance to pursue convictions resulting
in fines or imprisonment, even if such elements can be
proved, there appear to be substantial limitations to the use-
fulness of criminal parental liability statutes in the control of
juvenile delinquency. In fact, other than anecdotal evi-
inal liability ordinance being considered by the city council in Farmington, Min-
nesota); John Leo, Punished for the Sins of the Children, 118 U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT 18, June 12, 1995, (ordinance in Silverton, Oregon and proposed
Oregon statute which included mandatory parenting classes as well as fines in
possible sanctions); Parents are Charged after Crime by Kids, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6,
1990 at 3 (Grand Rapids, Michigan enforcing 20 year old criminal parental lia-
bility ordinance for the first time in 15 years; the law allows prosecution of par-
ents for failing to exercise "sufficient or reasonable control" over their children).
182. See, e.g., Claire Safran, Is It a Crime to be a Bad Parent? Holding Par-
ents Responsible for Their Children's Delinquency & Crimes, WoMAN's DAY,
May 1, 1990, at 64.
183. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 183, at Al.
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dence,18 4 there is no study which has been discovered which
has even attempted the perhaps impossible task of assessing
whether such criminal statutes do, in fact, result in a change
in the parent's behavior which in turn results in a reduction
in delinquent acts by his or her child.
Lacking empirical validation of their efficacy, the adop-
tion of criminal parental liability laws at the state or local
level appears based entirely on folk wisdom that parents
should be "in control" of their children at all times.
If parents are not "in control," some recent ordinances
provide a less harsh alternative to parental punishment by
fine or incarceration.1 8 5 If parents are not in control of their
children, then they can be coercively taught parenting skills,
so they will become in control (and presumably then can be
punished by harsher means if the children continue their de-
linquent behavior).18 6
At the state level, a criminal statute in California has
been recently used by The City Attorney's Office of Los Ange-
les to "encourage" parents to attend parenting classes as a
means of reducing juvenile delinquency.'" 7 Unlike various
recent local ordinances, that statute has been analyzed in de-
tail in a California case which finally held that the statute
was constitutional. 8 8
IV. PARENTING CLASSES: MANDATORY PARENT SKILLS
TRAINING AS A NEW SOLUTION TO THE JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY PROBLEM
The use of parental liability statutes as a means of con-
trolling juvenile delinquency has taken an new turn in Cali-
fornia, with an amendment to the contributing statute, Penal
Code § 272, ("§ 272") effective in 1988. That amendment ad-
184. See Judge Paul W. Alexander, What's This About Punishing Parents, 12
FED. PROBATION 23 (1948), which has been cited by many authors as an empiri-
cal research study of the efficacy of parental liability laws (Alexander concluded
that although sometimes effective, these laws usually did not work to reduce
juvenile delinquency). In fact, Alexander, a judge in the Toledo, Ohio, juvenile
court, did no more than give his opinion about the effectiveness of these laws
based on an informal review of the decisions in his court. No attempt at ac-
cepted social science methodology was made (or intended).
185. See discussion infra Part IV.
186. See discussion infra Part IV.
187. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (Deering Supp. 1996).
188. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993), superseding Williams v.
Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472 (Ct. App. 1991).
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ded the following language to the statute: "For the purpose of
this section, a parent or legal guardian to any person under
the age of 18 years shall have the duty to exercise reasonable
care, supervision, protection, and control over their minor
child."8 9
Before the 1988 amendment, the California statute con-
tained more general wording, typical of many contributing
statutes, which provided for punishment of any adult who
contributed to the delinquency of a minor. 190 Under that pre-
vious version of § 272, a parent, like any other adult, could
theoretically be prosecuted for contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor. However, one author concluded that the
California contributing statute was not being used consist-
ently to "correct parental inadequacies" in an effort to reduce
juvenile delinquency, but instead was being used simply to
punish adults for their misconduct in contributing to the de-
linquency of minors.191
Consequently, the 1988 amendment to § 272 clearly
targeted parents: it was added at the behest of prosecutorial
agencies in the City and County of Los Angeles for the ex-
press purpose of deterring juvenile delinquency, particularly
juvenile gang activity, by affecting parental actions perceived
to cause such delinquency. 192
The amendment to § 272 was challenged by a taxpayer's
suit, alleging that its enforcement as amended constituted a
waste of public funds since the amended statute was uncon-
189. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (Deering Supp. 1996).
190. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (Deering 1985).
191. See Raymond J. Vincent, Expanding the Neglected Role of the Parent in
the Juvenile Court, 4 PEPP. L. REV. 523, 531 (1977). In reviewing the 1961
amendment to Section 272, which placed jurisdiction of adults accused of con-
tributing to the delinquency of a minor in the juvenile court, Vincent (at the
time, a sitting judge in the California trial court) concluded that the main pur-
pose of Section 272 was not "rectification of parental inadequacies," but punish-
ment of the adult offender, whether a parent or unrelated adult, for his or her
misconduct. Id. Vincent commented that "[a review of the cases decided under
Section 272] fails to disclose any consistent use of the contributing law as a tool
for correcting parental inadequacies in conjunction with juvenile delinquency
proceedings." Id. at 532. Judge Vincent suggested that the courts in California
were not using the contributing statute as a means of coercing changes in pa-
rental conduct "most likely due to a combination of the absence of any valid
indication that this method has been used effectively elsewhere and the over-
whelming weight of respected professional opinion in opposition to it." Id. at
532.
192. See discussion infra Part IV.
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stitutionally vague and overbroad on its face, and was also an
unconstitutional interference with the right to privacy under
both the federal and state constitutions. 193
The California Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision,
reversed the decision by the appellate court, which had found
the statute as amended void for vagueness: the California
Supreme Court held that the amendment was neither uncon-
stitutionally vague 194 nor overbroad, 19 5 and did not interfere
with the parents' constitutional right to raise their children,
to educate their children, and to privacy in family life. 196 The
193. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993), superseding Williams v.
Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472 (Ct. App. 1991).
194. On the issue whether the wording of the statute was unconstitutionally
vague, the court concluded that the statute must be definite enough to provide a
standard of conduct for persons who might be prosecuted, and must also pro-
vide "a standard for police enforcement and for ascertainment of guilt." Id. at
509. The court asked whether a parent of ordinary intelligence would under-
stand the duty to "supervise" and "control" his or her children. See id. Analo-
gizing to the California parental tort liability statute, the court concluded that
the legislature must have acted "with full knowledge" of the existing tort law,
and must have intended to incorporate into the penal code section the standard
of reasonable supervision and control contained in the tort cases. See id. at 512.
The court went on to find that it was "impossible" to provide "a comprehen-
sive statutory definition of reasonable supervision and control," but found that
this was unnecessary. See id. at 513. The court found that the concept of "rea-
sonable" supervision and control was specific enough, particularly in light of the
"heightened standard" of duty which the court held was necessarily required by
this criminal statute: the parent's act or failure to act had to be at least crimi-
nally negligent. Id. at 513. The court pointed out that criminal negligence was
more than mere civil negligence, requiring an act or omission which was "aggra-
vated, culpable, gross or reckless." Id. The court confirmed that parents who
intentionally failed to perform their duty of supervision and control would also
be liable under Section 272. See id. at 514.
Referring again by analogy to the parental tort liability statute in Califor-
nia, the court further found that "a parent who makes reasonable efforts to con-
trol a child but is not actually able to do so does not breach the duty of control
[under Penal Code section 272 as amended]." Id. at 514.
By thus incorporating into the statute definitions and requirements found
in other state criminal and tort statutes, the California Supreme Court was
able to find that the amendment to Penal Code section 272 was not unconstitu-
tionally vague on its face in the notice it gave to parents who might be prose-
cuted. Similar reasoning by the court supported its finding that the statute was
also not constitutionally void for vagueness on the ground that there was a dan-
ger of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. See id. at 516.
195. See Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 516. After commenting that "a facial over-
breadth challenge is difficult to sustain," id. at 516, the court concluded, with-
out an in-depth discussion, that the statute was not overbroad. See id. at 517.
196. Id.
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court thus held that Penal Code § 272 as amended was
constitutional. 197
The California Supreme Court decision did not discuss in
detail the rationale behind the amendment to the statute. 198
The court did mention briefly that the amendment was en-
acted as part of the Street Terrorism Prevention Act, aimed
at reducing the activity of juvenile gangs in the City of Los
Angeles, and stated that it "appear[s] intended to enlist par-
ents as active participants in the effort to eradicate such
gangs."' 99
The court never engaged in an analysis of whether par-
ents generally were a major cause of their children's involve-
ment in such gangs. Commenting on the lower appellate
court's concern about the causal link between parental be-
havior and juvenile delinquency, the court admitted that the
causal element required for a criminal conviction under the
criminal negligence standard might be difficult to establish:
[Tihe causation element of section 272 could be more diffi-
cult to apply when the question is whether a parent's fail-
ure to supervise or control a child caused the child to be-
come delinquent than when the parent's potentially
culpable conduct is of a more direct nature-for example,
when the parent is an accomplice of the minor in the com-
mission of the crime.200
The court concluded, however, that "the same causal
question" had not proven "unduly troublesome" under the
California parental tort liability statute,20 ' and suggested
that the "opportunity for parental diversion" under the stat-
ute "suggests that as a practical matter a parent will face
criminal penalties under § 272 for failure to supervise only in
197. See id at 517.
198. See id. at 514-15. The plaintiff-appellant taxpayers had claimed that
the statute set forth a new standard, making parents vicariously liable for the
acts of their children; the defendants (the Los Angeles County District Attorney
and the Los Angeles City Attorney) alternatively claimed that the amendment
to the statute merely clarified the existing duty of parents under section 272
before it was amended. See id. The California Supreme Court felt it was un-
necessary to resolve this issue in addressing the constitutional claims before
the court, stating that the analysis would be the same, regardless of whether
the amendment added to, or merely clarified, the prior statutory wording. See
id. at 512-13.
199. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 510 (Cal. 1993), superseding Wil-
liams v. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472 (Ct. App. 1991).
200. Id. at 515.
201. See id.
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those cases in which the parent's culpability is great and the
causal connection correspondingly clear."
20 2
The diversion program in question was only briefly refer-
enced by the California Supreme Court in its opinion, which
without further comment or analysis stated that the legisla-
ture had adopted a parent diversion program which "under
special circumstances" allowed the probation department to
recommend that parents (or guardians) charged under § 272
could be diverted to "an education, treatment or rehabilita-
tion program;" after successful completion, the criminal
charges would be dismissed.20 3
Although barely touched upon in the California Supreme
Court opinion, a review of the lower court appellate opinion
in the Williams case and contemporaneous popular media re-
ports suggests that the real purpose behind the amendment
to § 272 was to force the parents of children involved in juve-
nile gangs into parenting classes as part of an aggressive
multifaceted anti-juvenile gang program initiated by the City
and County of Los Angeles.20 4
The lower court first placed the parental liability provi-
sions of § 272 in context, as only one part of a comprehensive
statutory scheme designed to reduce "criminal street gang ac-
tivity," which consisted primarily of the Street Terrorism En-
forcement and Prevention Act (the STEP Act).20 5 The court
pointed out that parental criminal liability under § 272 was
not, like the provisions of the STEP Act, specifically targeted
at controlling juvenile criminal street gang activity.20 6
202. Id.
203. See id. at 508, citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.70-75. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1001.74 states, in pertinent part: "[I1f the divertee has performed satisfacto-
rily during the period of diversion, the criminal charges shall be dismissed."
See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (Deering Supp. 1996).
204. Williams v. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472 (Ct. App. 1991), superseded by
Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
205. See Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474. The STEP Act made participation in
a street gang and its criminal activities punishable as a misdemeanor or felony;
created new sentencing enhancements for felonies committed in conjunction
with street gang activities; and declared buildings or places used by street
gangs for the purpose of gang activity or crimes to be nuisances. See id. citing
CAL. PENAL CODE §186.22 (a) and (b); §186.22a (a) (Deering 1988 and Supp.
1997).
206. See Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474, quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 272. The
court quoted the entire penal code section, apparently to emphasize that it was
a typical contributing statute, making it a crime for any adult to contribute to
the delinquency (or dependency) of a minor child. Only the last sentence of the
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The court found there was no legislative history available
to show the intent of the legislature in enacting the amend-
ment to § 272.207 Although ultimately finding that her testi-
mony was not admissible as an indication of legislative in-
tent,2 °8 the court quoted from the declaration of an aide of the
state senator who had sponsored the bill which included the
STEP Act and the amendment to § 272.209
The aide to the state senator stated that the language for
the bill had actually been drafted by the Los Angeles City At-
torney's Office and the Los Angeles County District Attor-
ney's Office.210  Her opinion was that these sponsoring
prosecutorial agencies' primary objective in amending § 272
was to use the initiation of criminal prosecutions against par-
ents as a means of diverting those parents into parenting
classes, not as a means of obtaining criminal convictions
against them.2 1'
The city attorney's office had submitted to the court his
guidelines (the City Attorney Parenting Program Procedures
(CAPP)) for implementing the parental diversion program.212
The processing procedure for possible § 272 violations under
penal code section, added by the amendment, focused on parental supervision
and control. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (Deering Supp. 1996).
207. See Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478. The court reported that defendants
had submitted a declaration that they had paid a private research firm to con-
duct a legislative history search on the amendment, and that the search had not
found any committee discussions or legislative hearings on the amendment pre-
served by either tape or transcription. The court concluded that other docu-
ments presented by the defendants regarding the legislative history of the
amendment "also failed to reveal any contemporaneous discussion of the paren-
tal responsibility amendment." Id.
208. See id. at 482.
209. See id. at 477-78.
210. See Williams v. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472, 477 (Ct. App. 1991), super-
seded by Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
211. See id. The legislative aide to Senator Robbins, Terri Burns, stated that
the language of the bill (including the STEP Act, § 272 and the diversion pro-
gram) had come from the L.A. County District Attorney's Office and the L.A.
City Attorney's office. See id. She stated: "Combined with the diversion pro-
gram, it was our intent that a larger number of prosecutions be initiated
against parents who were in violation of. . . § 272 by omitting their legal re-
sponsibilities, yet normally providing education and treatment opportunities
for these individuals." Id.
212. See id. at 478. Those guidelines provided that a parent would only be
prosecuted if "he/she knew or should have known that his/her conduct was
likely to result in delinquency and he/she had some ability to control the child."
See id. Thus, the city attorney claimed to be requiring the elements of mens rea
and causation which the California Supreme Court would eventually find the
amended Section 272 required. See discussion supra note 194.
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the city attorney's CAPP program suggests that agencies use
§ 272 primarily as a means of getting parents into parenting
programs, not as a means of criminally prosecuting them.
First, the city attorney's office initially reviews the docu-
ments submitted by any referring agency recommending
prosecution of a parent under § 272.213 The next step is the
referral of the documentation to an administrator of the
parenting program for an office hearing with the parent(s).214
In that meeting, the parent is offered a chance to avoid possi-
ble criminal prosecution by enrolling in a parent training/
counseling program chosen by the administrator.2 15 Step
three is the prosecution of parents failing to participate in the
parenting program.216
The use of amended § 272 by the Los Angeles City Attor-
ney's Office, both before and after the California Supreme
Court decision in the Williams case, confirms that a new ra-
tionale for parental liability statutes is being tested in Cali-
fornia: if lack of adequate parental control and supervision is
a primary cause of juvenile delinquency (and particularly
participation in juvenile gangs engaging in criminal behav-
ior), then perhaps parent training, not parent punishment,
will provide the much desired deterrent effect.
At the time the Williams case was appealed, there was a
notorious case which had received much publicity in the pop-
ular media, both locally and nationally. In that case, Gloria
Williams, a single, African American mother residing with
her children in a gang-infested neighborhood in South Los
Angeles, was charged with violating § 272 after her teenage
son was accused of participating in a vicious rape of a young
girl by members of a juvenile street gang.217 When it was
determined that she had attended parenting classes before
she was arrested, the charges against Ms. Williams were
dropped.218
213. See id. at 479.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See Williams v. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472, 479 (Ct. App. 1991), super-
seded by Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
217. See Ginger Thompson, Gang Member's Mother Denies Failure Charge,
L.A. TimEs, May 20, 1989, Metro at 1; Phillip Carrizosa, Prosecutions of Gang
Members' Parents Allowed, L.A. DAILY J., July 2, 1993, at 1.
218. See Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476-77.
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Her case was apparently an impetus for the taxpayer's
suit in Williams, although the fact she had the same name as
the named plaintiff in that case appears coincidental. 219 The
plaintiffs in the Williams case raised the Gloria Williams in-
cident in their argument before the lower appellate court 220
as referenced in that court's opinion; the California Supreme
Court opinion does not refer to the Gloria Williams matter at
all.22 1 The plaintiffs used Gloria Williams as an example of
the "pernicious reach" of the statute, claiming that the only
evidence of Ms. Williams encouragement of her son's gang ac-
tivities, as reported in two articles in the L.A. Times newspa-
per, were pictures of her and her children using street gang
signs.222 Plaintiffs claimed that the defendant prosecutors
intended to enforce § 272 against the parents of children be-
longing to juvenile gangs "even though many of the factors
which may lead children to associate with gang members are
beyond the parents' control."22 3
The prosecution of Gloria Williams resulted in a flurry of
press and television coverage of the parental liability statute,
as amended. Defendant Ira Reiner, District Attorney for the
County of Los Angeles, as quoted by plaintiffs in their moving
papers, had stated in a television interview: "These... gangs
are made up of nothing but just a pack of killers.. .. Each
and every one of them is a sociopathic killer. The Crips and
the Bloods are nothing but killers .... Frankly, I think it is a
very good policy to hold these kinds of parents
accountable."224
Exactly what are "these kinds of parents?" Other popu-
lar press reports of reactions to the Gloria Williams incident
suggests that "these parents" are perceived more as unskilled
"trainable" parents, than as lazy or malicious parents.225 If
this is the case, does parent skills training offer a possible
way of reducing juvenile delinquency when children appear
219. See id. at 472.
220. See id. at 475.
221. See Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
222. See Williams v. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472, 476 (Ct. App. 1991), super-
seded by Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
223. Id.
224. Id., quoting from plaintiffs moving papers, citing 'Crossfire' (television
broadcast, May 9, 1989).
225. See, e.g., Gloria Molina, Law On Parental Responsibility, L.A. TIMES,
July 11, 1989, Metro, pt.2 at 6.
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to be beyond the control of their parents? Unfortunately, the
Los Angeles City Attorney's Office has not published any as-
sessment of its training program: it is impossible to conclude
whether that program has been effective or not. Information
from the popular press indicates that although very few par-
ents have actually been prosecuted under § 272 in Los Ange-
les, by mid-1993 over a thousand parents had been referred
to parenting classes, and over 600 had actually completed the
classes, to avoid prosecution.226
Since there is no direct information from the Los Angeles
City Attorney's program about its effectiveness, how can we
consider applying substantial public resources to maintain-
ing the program, and forcing parents to participate in it? Do
the theories and research on the causes of juvenile delin-
quency offer some insights into the efficacy of parental pun-
ishment or parental training as a means of reducing juvenile
delinquency?
V. THEORIES AND RESEARCH IN SUPPORT OF PARENTAL
LIABILITY FOR JUVENILE DELINQUENCY:
No EASY SOLUTIONS
A review of the parental liability laws in the United
States, whether civil or criminal in nature, and of both the
official and popular reasoning which supports these laws,
presents a consistent theme: juvenile delinquency will be re-
duced if parents are threatened with civil or criminal penal-
ties for their children's delinquent acts.227 Sometimes ex-
pressed, more often unstated but clearly implied, is the
conviction that parents generally have the ability to prevent
delinquent behavior in their children by appropriate supervi-
sion and control of the child.228 Thus, the parent is presumed
to be a significant, if not exclusive, causal agent in the delin-
quency of his or her child.
Further, the case decisions, the legislative history, and
the popular press, in presenting a rationale for punishing
parents for the delinquent acts of their children, often either
explicitly or implicitly suggest that the lack of supervision
and control of children is due primarily to negligence or lazi-
ness on the part of the parents. The parents know what to do
226. See Carrizosa, supra note 217.
227. See discussion supra Part III.
228. See discussion supra Part III.
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and when to do it, but are at some level "choosing" not to.2 29
Thus, the threat of either civil or criminal liability is per-
ceived as the added incentive needed for the parent to do
what the parent knows she or he should do, and can do.23 °
The adoption of the amendment to § 272 in California in
1988, and its present use by the City Attorney's Office in Los
Angeles, suggests a different rationale for these laws: par-
ents are not choosing to be "bad" parents, they simply are not
properly trained to be "good" parents. 231 This new rationale
for parental liability laws has resulted in the Los Angeles
City Attorney's Office embracing parenting classes as at least
part of the solution to the juvenile delinquency problem.232
Notably lacking in the case law, legislative history, or
popular press discussion of parental liability laws is a critical
analysis of the premises upon which they are based.233 Since
the constitutionality of these laws has generally been tested
under a rational basis analysis, courts have tended to ap-
prove the legislative decision to make parents criminally or
civilly liable for their children's delinquent acts without much
discussion of the underlying legislative reasoning. Of course,
the criminal statutes generally require that the elements of
mens rea and criminal causation be proved as to the parent,
but the cases do not appear to seriously question that causa-
tion can be proved.234
A review of the scholarly discourse and research in the
interdisciplinary area of juvenile justice provides additional
useful insights into the legitimacy of the legal focus on paren-
tal liability. Certainly the definition of the problem of juve-
nile delinquency necessarily defines the solutions, legal and
otherwise, which are proposed and implemented.2 35
Below are summarized some of the most widely accepted
theories about the causes of juvenile delinquency which have
been developed in the scholarly literature.236 The role of the
parent in such theories, if any, is discussed.237 Following the
229. See discussion supra Part III.
230. See discussion supra Part III.
231. See discussion supra Part IV.
232. See discussion supra Part IV.
233. See discussion supra Part III.
234. See discussion supra Parts III, IV.
235. See M.A. BORTNER, supra note 22, at 205.
236. See discussion infra Part V.A.
237. See discussion infra Part V.A.
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discussion of theory is a review of recent empirical research
which might provide some insights to the questions: (1) Does
"bad" parenting cause juvenile delinquency?; (2) If so, can
"bad" parenting be corrected by parenting classes?; and, fi-
nally, (3) If "good" parenting can be taught, does a change in
the parent's parenting skills in fact reduce juvenile delin-
quency in that parent's child, as the Los Angeles approach
presumes?238
A. Theories of the Causes of Juvenile Delinquency:
The Role of the Parent
Juvenile delinquency and its causes has been the subject
of scholarly comment and research in a number of disciplines,
including anthropology, criminology, law, psychology, psychi-
atry, sociology and social work.239 Not surprisingly, given the
variety of perspectives across these disciplines and the multi-
plicity of factors which might affect all types of human behav-
ior, including juvenile delinquency, no consensus has devel-
oped regarding the causes of juvenile delinquency.24 °
The "bad parents cause juvenile delinquency" theory has
enjoyed a great deal of popularity in the 20th century United
States, first, in the development of the juvenile justice sys-
tem,241 and second, in the development of a statutory scheme
in most states for both criminal and tort liability of parents
for the juvenile delinquency of their children.242
Despite this popularity among laypeople, lawyers and
legislators, most theories about the causes of juvenile delin-
quency do not focus primarily on parenting skills; in fact,
many respected current theories ignore or minimize the im-
portance of parenting skills in the causation of juvenile delin-
quency. The current most popular theories, drawn from a
number of disciplines, are discussed briefly below, emphasiz-
ing the role that parenting plays in each theory.
1. Biological Theories
Now discredited, in the late 19th and early 20th centu-
ries there were several respected proponents of the theory
238. See discussion infra Part V.B.
239. See Geis & Binder, supra note 104, at 83-197.
240. See id.
241. See discussion supra Part II.
242. See discussion supra Part III.
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that juvenile delinquency was primarily caused by biological
factors, and that criminals could be recognized because of
their distinct physiological characteristics.243
Recently, biological theories have become popular
again.244 Medical research in the areas of brain tumors and
other disorders, hormonal imbalances and other abnormali-
ties of the endocrine system, hyperkinesis, chromosomal ab-
normalities, birth defects, nutritional deficiencies and learn-
ing disabilities, have all generated hypotheses that there may
be a link between biological factors and deviant behavior, in-
cluding juvenile delinquency.245
However, it has been suggested that this is due not only
to technological advances, but also for political and social rea-
sons.246 If biological factors primarily cause deviant criminal
behavior such as juvenile delinquency, then the solutions will
be medical or other therapeutic interventions aimed at the
individual.2 47 It has been suggested such medical solutions
to the problem of juvenile delinquency are politically
motivated:
[B]iological theories deflect attention away from the role
of society and social relations in generating human behav-
ior, including nonconformity and crime .... Essentially,
if the public believes that nonconformity is "preordained"
by biology or inevitable due to biological factors it may re-
sult in... a denial or abdication of social responsibility for
producing such behavior.248
Parenting is not a focus of the biological theories at all
(although parents are, as a potential source of inherited char-
acteristics). However, if the problem of juvenile delinquency
were defined as bad parenting, the same criticism could be
243. See M.A. BORTNER, supra note 22, at 206. The biological determinists
included Cesare Lombroso, Ernest Hooten, and William Sheldon. See id. at
207. Sheldon, for example, proposed that certain physiques corresponded to
certain temperaments, based on his study of 200 delinquent boys, who he con-
cluded were predominantly mesomorphic, with muscular bodies and heavy
bones, among other physical characteristics. See id. Sheldon's work has been
criticized for failing to recognize the socio-ecological context of physical charac-
teristics: behavior may be influenced by the stereotypes society gives to certain
body types; a big, strong boy may be perceived as a bully, for example. See id.




248. Id. at 209.
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leveled: both biological theories and "bad parent" theories di-
rect attention toward changing the individual and his family,
and important socio-economic forces which may be related to
juvenile delinquency may then be ignored.
2. Strain (Anomie) Theories
Strain theories, sometimes called "anomie" theories, pre-
sume that people generally are socialized into the majority
society, and therefore want to achieve the goals championed
by that society.24 9 However, when a person cannot achieve
such goals by means approved by the society, strain theories
hypothesize that a person will attempt to achieve those goals
by resorting to deviant behavior.2 50 Thus, for example, the
juvenile delinquent who steals a car is presumed to subscribe
to an accepted goal of the majority society: success measured
by material wealth. Unable to obtain this goal through
means accepted by the larger society as "legitimate," for ex-
ample by obtaining a job and buying the car, the delinquent
will violate the moral standards of society (which she or he
accepts) to obtain the desired goal by the deviant behavior of
stealing the car.
The focus of strain theories is thus the tension which de-
velops when a child who has adopted the aspirations of the
majority society does not have the ability or access, within his
or her immediate environment, of achieving those aspirations
in ways the society approves as legitimate. 251 The supervi-
sion and control of the parent, or other parenting skills, are
not perceived by this theory as a primary cause of juvenile
delinquency; instead, socio-ecological factors are perceived as
most important.
Strain theories have been criticized because they suggest
that juvenile delinquency is restricted to the "lower class," be-
cause they suggest that delinquency is a permanent attribute
of a person, and because they suggest that by adopting goals
and values which are approved by the majority society, a
child is more likely to become delinquent. 252
249. See TRAvis HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY 5 (1969).
250. See id.
251. See id. at 5.
252. See id. at 9-10.
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3. Cultural Deviance and Differential Association
Theories
Whereas strain theories presume that the juvenile delin-
quent is a child frustrated in his or her achievement of the
goals of the majority culture by legitimate means,253 cultural
deviance and differential association theories presume that
the child has never adopted the values and goals of the major-
ity culture at all.254 Instead, it is presumed that the juvenile
delinquent has adopted values and goals of a subculture (for
example, an urban juvenile gang), which approve of and en-
courage the juvenile delinquent acts.255 It is presumed that
the child is socialized into this alternative "deviant" culture
and learns delinquency from socializing within the deviant
group.25 6 According to this theory, parents "cause" juvenile
delinquency if they are part of the "deviant" subculture them-
selves and thus instrumental in the child's acculturation into
that deviant culture.25 7
This theory lends support to the popular idea that "bad"
parents cause delinquency in their children. However, it does
not support the wisdom of Los Angeles County's use of
parenting classes, since according to this theory parents are
not merely ignorant, they are in fact intentionally encourag-
ing the acts of delinquency in their children by the values
which they hold themselves. Furthermore, if the parents are
not part of the deviant subculture, these theories would sug-
gest that changes in parental control and supervision will not
matter, unless such changes can detach the child from the
subculture whose values he has adopted.
Although heavily criticized, cultural deviance theories
have remained a very popular perspective on juvenile delin-
quency theory and research.258
4. Control Theories
According to control theories, juvenile delinquency occurs
when the child's bonds to conventional society are "weak or
253. See discussion supra Part V.A.2.
254. See HIRSCHI, supra note 249, at 11-12.
255. See id. at 11-12.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id. at 13 (footnotes omitted).
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broken."259 According to Travis Hirschi, one of the most
respected proponents of control theory, there are four impor-
tant elements of this bond to conventional society: attach-
ment,26 ° commitment,26 1 involvement,262 and belief.263
The first element, attachment, refers to the child's affec-
tion for, and attachment to, various persons and institutions
within society.264 The terms "indirect control" or "internal
control" refer to the same element.265 Different control theo-
rists have answered the question: "bond to whom?" in various
ways.266 Hirschi, in his pioneering work, emphasizes the
child's attachment to parents,267 to the school and teach-
ers,268 and to peers.269
The second element, commitment, Hirschi defines as fol-
lows: "Few would deny that men on occasion obey the rules
simply from fear of the consequences. This rational compo-
nent in conformity we label commitment."270
The third element, involvement, reflects the idea that
substantial time and energy directed toward "conventional"
activities (schooling, work, hobbies) leaves little time for de-
linquent acts. 1
The fourth element of control theories, belief, particu-
larly distinguishes control theory from deviant culture theo-
ries: "The person is assumed to have been socialized (per-
haps imperfectly) into the group whose rules he is violating
.... [We not only assume the deviant has believed the rules,
we assume he believes the rules even as he violates them."272
Parents, then, are presumed to heavily influence
whether their children commit acts of juvenile delinquency:
"It is in control theory [as compared to other theories of juve-
nile delinquency], then, that attachment to parents becomes
259. See id. at 16.
260. See HIRSCHI, supra note 249, at 16.
261. See id. at 20.
262. See id. at 21.
263. See id. at 23.
264. See id. at 19.
265. See id. (footnotes omitted), referring to terms used by another control
theorist, F. Ivan Nye, in his research and writings.
266. See HIRSCHI, supra note 249, at 19.
267. See id. at 85.
268. See id. at 120.
269. See id. at 134-61.
270. Id. at 20.
271. Id.
272. See HiRsCHI, supra note 249, at 23.
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a central variable, and many of the variations in explanations
of this relation may be found within the control theory
tradition."273
Control theories have been criticized for emphasizing of-
ficial definitions of delinquency and official statistics (for ex-
ample, police records), for uncritically accepting a scientific
model, for a traditional correctional focus that emphasizes
adjusting the juvenile to the larger society, for ignoring the
role of the juvenile court in defining and perpetuating delin-
quency, and finally for ignoring the importance of overall
socio-economic factors which might affect delinquency.274
B. Parenting and Juvenile Delinquency: Current
Empirical Studies
1. Does Poor Parenting Cause Juvenile Delinquency?
Because control theories, of all the currently popular the-
ories regarding the causes of juvenile delinquency, focus most
directly upon the role of the parents, and support a scientific
model, it is not surprising that much of the empirical re-
search on parenting and juvenile delinquency is grounded in
a control theory approach. The results of current empirical
research suggest that a parent's actions may affect whether a
child commits juvenile delinquent acts, but such research is
far from conclusive, or consistent.
For example, Harriet Wilson, in a 1980 study conducted
in Great Britain, explored whether the amount of supervision
of children by their parents was related to the amount of ju-
venile delinquent acts by the children.275 Her study analyzed
children in urban and suburban environments.276 Conclud-
ing that juvenile delinquency was in fact related to lack of
parental supervision, Wilson cautioned against a conclusion
that parents therefore caused the delinquency.2 77 She con-
cluded that the lack of supervision by parents was caused by
"severe social handicap:" those parents in the poorest and
273. Id. at 86.
274. See M.A. BORTNER, supra note 22, at 229.
275. See Harriet Wilson, Parental Supervision: A Neglected Aspect of Delin-
quency, 20 BRIT. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 203 (1980).
276. See id. at 204.
277. See id. at 233-34.
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most crime-infested areas, and with the most limited re-
sources, were the ones providing the least supervision.278
Another study by Phyllis Gray-Ray and Melvin C. Ray in
1990 used a control theory model to test the relationship be-
tween parenting and juvenile delinquency in a sample of Afri-
can American delinquent children.279 They concluded that
the traditional control theory model did not entirely apply:
"direct control" of children by their parents in the form of
structure and supervision did not correlate with lower juve-
nile delinquency (the theory predicted it would), although pa-
rental rejection of children did correlate with increased juve-
nile delinquency (as the theory had predicted).28 0  The
authors hypothesized that differences between the family
structure in Mrican American families and majority culture
white families might cause the difference in results obtained
by these authors.28 1
Ruth Seydlitz, in a 1993 article, states that a "major
problem in the field of delinquency is the low explanatory
power of the theories."282 She criticizes control theories for
being too simplistic, and often ignoring the affects upon delin-
quency of significant variables such as gender of the child,
age of the child, and type of delinquency.28 3 She concludes
that "the social control theories . . .and power-control the-
ory-cannot account for the complexity in the relationship
between parents and delinquency."28 4 She suggests that
more research is needed and that current control theories
and other theories may need to be revised to take into ac-
count the complexity of the relationships as reflected in her
study.285
Thus, even among those researchers accepting a theory
of delinquency which posits that parenting has a relationship
to whether a child commits delinquent acts, there is not a
consensus that empirical research unreservedly "proves" this
278. See id.
279. See Phyllis Gray-Ray & Melvin C. Ray, Juvenile Delinquency in the
Black Community, 22(1) YOUTH & Soc'v 67 (1990).
280. See id. at 78-81.
281. See id.
282. Ruth Seydlitz, Complexity in the Relationships Among Direct and Indi-
rect Parental Controls and Delinquency, 24(3) YOUTH & Soc'y 243 (1993).
283. See id. at 244.
284. Id.
285. See id. at 268.
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key rationale for the parental liability laws in the United
States. Most current researchers concede that the relation-
ship between the family and juvenile delinquency is complex,
and that a "bad" parent is not the sole cause of a "bad" child.
2. Will Parenting Classes Decrease Juvenile
Delinquency?
Nonetheless, some empirical support for parenting
classes as a solution to juvenile delinquency does exist. A
1988 article by Mark W. Fraser, J. David Hawkins and Mat-
thew 0. Howard has summarized prior research in this area
and concluded that consistent child-rearing practices can be
taught in parenting classes, and that such consistent child-
rearing practices do in fact increase the attachment of the
child to the parent, and decrease juvenile delinquent acts by
the child.28 6
At present, a longitudinal study is being conducted by
Jerry Patterson of the Oregon Social Learning Center, under
a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health.2" 7 Pat-
terson has claimed that "simple parenting skills" which can
be taught, can overcome other factors which may affect delin-
quency, such as poverty or bad schools.288
VI. CONCLUSION
Parental liability laws in the United States first became
popular in the 1950's and 1960's, and they continue to be en-
forced today against parents as a means of controlling juve-
nile delinquency. Under the tort parental liability statutes,
parents are vicariously liable for civil damages in tort for the
delinquent acts of their children. Although neither parental
knowledge nor action is required for such vicarious liability
based solely on the parent/child relationship, the premise be-
hind the tort legislation seems to be that parents should
know how to control their children, should have the ability to
do so, and should therefore be held responsible if the child
commits delinquent acts which cause injury to innocent third
parties and/or damage to property.
286. See Mark W. Fraser, J. David Hawkins & Matthew 0. Howard, Parent
Training for Delinquency Prevention, in FAMILY PERSPECTIVES IN CHILD AND
YOUTH SERVICES 93 (1988).
287. See Vince Bielski, Bad to the Bone?, CALIFORNIA LAw., Oct. 1993 at 73.
288. See id. at 76.
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Under the criminal parental liability laws, the elements
of both criminal intent and criminal causation on the part of
the parent must be proved in order to convict him or her in
connection with the truancy, curfew violations, or other delin-
quent acts by his or her child. Thus, for criminal liability to
attach, the prosecuting agency must show that the parent did
indeed have actual control over the minor child, which he or
she failed to adequately exercise. In many instances this
may, in fact, be the case. But what if the child is in fact real-
istically beyond the parent's control? In that event, the Los
Angeles City Attorney's Office has suggested an easy solu-
tion: train the parent to be an effective parent, and the child
will then be under the parent's effective control, and the
child's acts of delinquency will cease.
Some empirical research suggests that, in some cases,
parents can be trained to be more effective parents, and learn
to better supervise and control their children. In those cases,
parent training (if adequate) may in fact result in the reduc-
tion of juvenile delinquency. However, what if the act ofjuve-
nile delinquency which is the basis of the parent's prosecu-
tion is due primarily to other factors, and not to the parent's
faulty supervision and control? Then neither parent training
nor parent punishment will help. Although the sweeping so-
cial reform suggested in the 1960's has been rejected as un-
workable and perhaps naive, the severe social problems
which the reformers sought to address: poverty, inner city
slums, lack of educational, recreational, and job opportunities
for many youth, and other problems of our complex urban so-
ciety, have not disappeared. When children are beyond their
parent's control, then parental liability legislation will not re-
duce juvenile delinquency. Thus, the parental liability laws
in the United States provide only a limited solution to the
multifaceted problem of juvenile delinquency, and that solu-
tion has not been shown to be particularly effective.
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